Theory suggests that increasing the public availability of regulatory information may hurt the information environment of bank stocks. It is therefore not clear whether the Basel Accord's intent to foster market discipline by requiring banks to publish information on their risk management practices and exposures is beneficial. Using a sample of the 54 largest banks in Australia, Canada, India, Singapore, South Africa and UK, we find that, with the exception of South Africa and Singapore, there is a reduction in time-waited bid-ask spreads post the implementation of Pillar 3 reporting. The preliminary evidence suggests that increasing the availability of hitherto private information on risk management practices is welfare enhancing.
Introduction
Basel Rules establish requirements for new regulatory capital maintenance guidelines and their alignment with underlying risks. 1 Under the Basel II and Basel III Accords, Pillar 3 reporting, which represents Market Discipline or Disclosure, is in place to enhance and complement Pillars 1 and 2 and ultimately promote additional transparency. Specifically, Pillar 3 enforces the market discipline with disclosures of objectives and policies of risk management for each risk type (credit risk, market risk, operational risk, interest rate risk in the banking book, equities), including: strategies and processes; structure and organization of the relevant risk management functions; extent and content of risk reporting and/or measurement systems; risk management/risk mitigation strategies and; processes for monitoring the efficiency of risk mitigation strategies. The disclosures encourage market discipline by allowing market participants to assess key pieces of information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence the capital adequacy of the institution. Effectively, Pillar 3 reporting makes available to the public bank risk information that was formally only exchanged between banks and regulators. The creation of these disclosure requirements is one of the most significant innovations to the Basel system of regulating banks. In this paper we ask the question: did Pillar 3
reporting provide investors with meaningful information they did not already have?
That is, did it improve the information environment of bank stocks?
It is unclear from a theoretical perspective whether additional disclosures about banks' risk exposures reduce or increase financial market uncertainty and economic efficiency (e.g., Morris and Shin (2002) ; Goldberg and Sapra (2011) ). On the one hand, for market discipline induced by such disclosures to be effective, market participants monitor and influence the risk-taking behavior of financial institutions (Bliss and Flannery (2002) ). The literature makes two distinctions of market discipline: (1) direct market discipline refers to the influence market participants exercise directly on the behavior of a financial institution; (2) indirect market discipline refers to supervisory intervention triggered by signals generated by the market. Market discipline in these two instances works through price adjustments of the cost of debt or equity, and, with it, the willingness of investors to supply funds to a bank, and as a potential trigger for supervisory attention (Llewellyn (2009) (2014)). The literature argues that the availability of more precise public information can be detrimental to welfare if agents (rationally) overreact to public information compared to the social optimum, and hence introduce noise in public signals that causes informational inefficiencies (Morris and Shin (2002) ). As a result, one can observe the perverse effect of increased aggregate volatility as economic activity becomes more sensitive to common noise. That the increased availability of public information can limit the incorporation of private signals into prices is also shown by models such as Amador and Weill (2010) and Duffie, Malamud and Manso (2010) in which a bad equilibrium can be selected in the presence of multiple equilibria. Morris and Shin (2007) (2008)) show that the cost of trading corporate bonds decreased after the increase in transparency that followed the 2002 requirement that bond dealers report their trades in publicly issued corporate bonds to the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD), which in turn made transaction data available to the public through the Transaction Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE).
participants than granular information, it is possible for increased transparency to be welfare decreasing. Our alternative hypothesis is therefore that increasing transparency through Pillar 3 disclosures reduces bank stock liquidity.
In order to evaluate our hypotheses on the effect of Pillar 3 disclosures on the information environment, we examine changes in bid-ask spreads at the time the disclosures became effective in six countries that were among the early adopters:
Australia, Canada, India, Singapore, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. Bid-ask spreads are a common proxy for information asymmetries (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985, Copeland and Galai, 1983) . The idea is that because informed parties only buy (sell) when the stock is under (over)-priced, market makers face an adverse selection problem. As information asymmetries increase, the spread widens as market makers attempt to prevent losses to informed parties and to recoup losses by profiting more in trades with uninformed parties.
Our sample of banks is based on markets whose national regulators had adopted Basel II Pillar 3 reporting by the end of 2012. The presence of several countries in our sample also adds potentially useful heterogeneity for purposes of interpreting the results of this analysis. Disclosure might be especially valuable in countries where bank stocks are subject to more severe information asymmetries (where investors had little information beyond that conveyed directly by banks).
However, banks in such countries might be likely to disclose information even without being compelled to. In the end, the outcomes of our analyses at the individual country level are an empirical matter.
We find that, with the exception of South Africa and Singapore, there is a reduction in time weighted bid-ask spreads (TWBAS) after the implementation of Pillar 3 reporting. The 19% average reduction in spreads reflects a highly significant decrease in information asymmetry or improvement in the liquidity of bank stocks as a result of the introduction of this market discipline tool.
Although our paper is set in the banking industry, the study complements the literature on corporate disclosure in general. Mandatory disclosure has been a favourite regulatory tool, lauded, for example, by successive SEC Chairmen because it "improves liquidity, reduces capital costs and makes fair market prices possible" (Levitt, 1997) . In the early accounting and corporate finance literatures it is often argued that because accurate information allows investors to price securities and to monitor managers' performance, thereby reducing agency costs, firms that fail to disclose information may find it hard and even impossible to raise money (Grossman, 1981, and Milgrom, 1981) . Firms that change over to better quality disclosure regimes benefit (Leuz and Verrecchia (2001). 3 However, the literature also recognises that while disclosure has benefits, it also has direct and indirect costs, and that too much disclosure may even exacerbate agency costs if investors are relatively uninformed and managers therefore myopic (Stein, 1988) . Thus, mandatory, uniform disclosure requirements may thus be unnecessary and even harmful (Choi and Guzman, 1997).
Institutional Background
In this section we describe the nature and timing of Pillar 3 disclosures in the respective countries represented in our sample. Pillar 3 of the Basel Accords requires national banking regulators to compel banks to provide investors with detailed information and data about the banks' risk management practices. These disclosures must be updated quarterly, semi-annually or annually, depending on each national regulator's guidelines, although this information should not necessarily be audited in  specified information about their capital structure, capital adequacy, credit risk and securitization, with additional information about these matters required for advanced ADIs;
 information about market risk, operational risk, equities and interest rate risk in the banking book; and  the full terms and conditions of their regulatory capital instruments.
The timing of the Pillar 3 disclosures in Australia depends on the nature of the information. Specified qualitative disclosures must be published on an annual basis, while specified quantitative disclosures must be published on a semi-annual basis, together with the quantitative disclosures from the previous semi-annual period. Yet other specified disclosures must be published on a quarterly basis together with the disclosures required from the previous quarterly period. To protect competition, subject to APRA's approval, there is an exemption for disclosures that might prejudice the position of an ADI by publicizing information that is proprietary and/or confidential in nature. Given that all institutions are required to implement the Basel III framework, the new composition of capital disclosure requirements also applies to all institutions.
However, the OSFI has an expectation that Domestic Systemically Important Banks (DSIBs) 6 should have public information disclosure practices that are among the best of their international peers. Moreover the OSFI provides additional guidelines to such banks to ensure comparability across jurisdictions. 3. Data, sample construction, and methods
Data sources and sample
The sample consists of 54 bank stocks from six countries: Australia, Canada, India, Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom. All these countries had instituted Pillar 3 reporting by the end of June 2013, permitting a post-introduction analysis.
The six countries are from a common law background and largely share the usage of English as a language for official communications.
There are multiple sources of data used in this study. For each country that mandates Pillar 3 reporting as described in Section 2 above, we accessed the full list of banks registered by a national regulator and listed on an exchange from the and South Africa were in bull markets while the UK was nearing the end of a long bear run when Pillar 3 reporting commenced.
Methods
disclosures on information asymmetry in our sample of bank stocks. The event date is the first date of the implementation of Pillar 3 reporting by each bank. For each bank stock, intraday data is collected for the 15-month period surrounding the event date.
The sample is split into a pre-event period of 180 trading days (-180 to -1) and a postevent period of 180 trading days (+30 to +270). The immediate 30-day period following the event date is excluded from the post-event analysis to allow for market participants digesting the new information being disclosed. We conduct robustness checks by varying the observation windows in the -180 to +270 period.
Our proxy for information asymmetry is the time-weighted relative spread (TWRS), which is the most widely used metric for information asymmetry in the literature (see, for example, McInish and Wood (1992) , Brockman and Chung (2003) and Chung, Elder and Kim (2010)). Following the literature, the time-weighted relative spread (TWRS) is the ratio of the time-weighted bid-ask spread (TWBAS) and the time-weighted midpoint price (TWMP):
( 1) where:
The Ask and Bid are the best (lowest) ask and the best (highest) bid in the order book for the specific bank in the specific market being examined. We observe the order book at half hour intervals. t refers to the amount of a time a spread exists during the half hour observation intervals for the specific bank in the specific market being
n is a count of the number of spreads during the half hour observation intervals for the specific bank in the particular market being examined.
Results
Our headline finding is that across the majority of countries in our sample (four out of six), and for the 180-day period following the month after the introduction of Pillar 3 reporting, time-weighted spreads decrease. The differences are highly statistically significant (at the 1% level in most cases). The exceptions are Singapore and South Africa (which we discuss further below). In percentage terms, the countries that experience the largest falls in TWBAS are, India (-35%), the UK (-20%), Australia (-10%) and Canada (-10%). The average reduction in TWBAS for these four countries is -19%. The direction of these results is generally confirmed for our longer alternative analysis windows, particularly (-180, +180). For the (-10, +10) event period, the consistent finding is one of insignificant differences in pre-and postPillar 3 reporting TWBAS. This vindicates our decision to exclude the immediate month following the initiation of Pillar 3 disclosures from our main analysis window.
The result for Australia requires a caveat. We find that when we do not exclude the month immediately following Pillar 3 disclosure commencement, i.e. use the (-180, 180) analysis window, the TWBAS in fact increases by 15%. This outcome is largely driven by increases in TWBAS in the immediate aftermath of Pillar 3 report initiation in which increases of 20%, 1% and 8% are recorded for the (-10, +10), (-30, +30 ) and (-90, +90) windows, respectively. Albeit, the positive differences are statistically insignificant.
We report increases in TWBAS for Singapore and South Africa following Pillar 3 reporting initiation. Notably, the increase in Singapore is only 2%, although this figure is statistically significant, and is confirmed for most alternative event periods. The magnitudes of TWBAS increases in South Africa are much larger, ranging from 18% to 24% where there is statistical significance. We can only speculate on the potential reasons for the difference in the direction of our findings when it comes to Singapore and South Africa. Future research may consider differences in institutional settings compared to the other four countries.
Conclusion
This paper presents the preliminary findings of a study of the impact of introducing show that the cost of trading corporate bonds decreased after the increase in transparency that followed the 2002 requirement that bond dealers report their trades in publicly issued corporate bonds to the NASD, which in turn made transaction data available to the public through the TRACE system.
an event (Pillar 3 reporting in our case) on information asymmetry using spreads as the proxy, we have not controlled for trading volume and volatility as potential spread determinants. We plan to perform a cross sectional analysis with spreads as the dependent variable, and a Pillar 3 reporting dummy and trading activity / volatility measures as the independent variables. We also plan to consider other measures of information asymmetry such as PIN from the microstructure literature. 
